When the same agent represents both sides
In most transactions in Marbella, one agent handles
everything. They list the property for the seller. They
show it to the buyer. They advise the seller on the
minimum acceptable price. They advise the buyer on how
much to offer. They negotiate between two parties whose
interests are directly opposed — while being paid by one
of them.
In Spain, this is legal.
In parts of the United States, it is restricted or
prohibited. In the UK, the distinction between estate
agents (who work for sellers) and buying agents (who work
for buyers) is well established. In Australia, buyer’s
advocacy is a regulated profession. The principle behind
these regulations is simple: when one professional serves
two parties with opposing interests, someone’s interests
will be subordinated.
The question is whose.
The mechanics of dual service
Consider what happens when an agent represents both sides
of a €5M transaction.
The seller wants the highest possible price. The buyer
wants the lowest. The agent’s commission is typically
calculated as a percentage of the sale price — meaning
the agent’s financial interest is structurally aligned
with the seller’s.
Now ask: when that agent advises the buyer on whether the
asking price is fair, whose interest shapes the answer?
When that agent tells the buyer “there’s another offer on
the table,” what incentive do they have to verify it?
When the buyer asks whether the urbanistic status of the
property has issues, how thorough will the investigation
be if finding a problem could kill the deal — and the
agent’s commission with it?
These are not accusations. They are structural
observations. The model creates the incentive. The
individuals operating within it respond accordingly.
What the buyer doesn’t see
In a dual-service model, the buyer typically does not
know:
The seller’s minimum acceptable price. The agent knows
this because the seller disclosed it in the listing
agreement. The buyer negotiates in the dark.
How long the property has actually been on the market.
Properties are sometimes relisted with a new date to
appear fresh. The agent knows the true timeline. The
buyer sees the manufactured one.
Whether comparable properties sold for less. The agent
has access to notarial data and market intelligence that
would strengthen the buyer’s negotiation position. But
sharing that data weakens the seller’s position — and the
agent’s commission.
What other properties in the market might be a better fit.
The agent shows their own inventory first. Properties held
by competing agencies — which might suit the buyer better
— are not part of the conversation unless the buyer asks.
And the buyer doesn’t know to ask because they don’t know
what they’re not seeing.
The cost of alignment
The financial impact of dual representation is difficult
to quantify precisely because the buyer rarely knows what
they could have achieved with independent advice. But the
indicators are measurable.
Negotiation leverage is reduced when the buyer’s advisor
also protects the seller’s price. Due diligence is less
rigorous when finding problems threatens the transaction.
Market access is narrower when the agent prioritises their
own listings. And the buyer’s time is consumed managing a
relationship where the counterparty’s loyalty is divided.
At price levels above €2M, each of these factors
translates to five- or six-figure consequences. A
negotiation delta of 5-10% on a €5M property is
€250,000-€500,000. A missed defect in urbanistic
compliance can cost €150,000 and eighteen months to
resolve. A property that was not the best available
option represents an opportunity cost that compounds
over time.
These are not edge cases. They are the structural
outcomes of a model where one professional serves two
masters.
The alternative exists
Separating the roles is not a radical proposition. It is
the standard in most regulated financial services. Your
lawyer does not also represent the other party. Your
wealth manager does not also advise the counterparty in
a transaction. The principle is the same: independent
representation protects the client’s interests because
there are no competing interests in the room.
A buyer-only advisor never lists properties. Never
represents sellers. Never takes commission from the
selling side. The result is advice that is structurally
aligned with one outcome: the buyer acquiring the right
property, at the right price, with full information.
In Marbella, this model is not yet common. That is not
because it doesn’t work. It is because the traditional
model works well — for the agencies.
A note for property owners
If you own a villa in Marbella, this analysis may read
as critical of the agency representing your property.
It is not.
A good listing agent serves the seller’s interests
effectively — and that includes maximising the sale price.
The point is not that seller’s agents are failing. It is
that buyer and seller have opposing interests, and a
single agent cannot optimally serve both.
For the seller, the best outcome is an informed buyer
who makes a clean, well-structured offer — because
informed buyers close. The worst outcome is a buyer
who discovers problems after signing and initiates legal
action, or who pulls out during due diligence because
the issues were not identified earlier.
Structured representation on both sides of the
transaction does not threaten the seller. It
professionalises the process for everyone.
—
Puro Dreams Realty represents buyers only — never sellers,
never developers. Direct access to the full luxury and
ultra-luxury market in Marbella, Benahavís and Estepona.